The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede. The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain
More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies. More likely against democratic targets; less likely against
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.
Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place:
: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation